We study here the early impacts of the Peruvian rural roads program (RRP), characterized by the contracting of private local firms for the rehabilitation and maintenance of rural roads with local supervision by community leaders setting incentives that favour prevention activities and a sustainable and timely maintenance of rural roads. The analysis is based on a quasi-experimental approach through which control roads are defined prior to the intervention based on key observable characteristics of the road and the villages they connect. Diff-in-Diff estimates are reported to control for biases associated to time-invariant unobservables. We find that this institutional innovation improved road transitability which in turn led to significant changes in employment patterns, increased investments in education and health, but not to higher household labor income. We cannot discard that lack of income effects can be explained by the short time allowed for this evaluation (2 years from baseline), as we do observe individuals in treated motorized roads (MRs) increase waged employment while females in non-motorized tracks (NMTs) increase work at the family farms. In turn, increases in household investments in human capital are strong and robust in treated MRs. School attendance increases, although some gender inequities remain as older girls (12-18) do not show such improvements. Reduced morbidity for children under five and improved access to early childhood development programs is also observed in treated MRs. Thus, despite the lack of income effects, the results of this early evaluation are encouraging about the impacts of the Peruvian RRP. The contracting of local private firms for the rehabilitation and maintenance of rural roads in developing countries may quickly improve rural roads and change economic and social opportunities for rural households. Still, further studies are required to determine whether lack of income effects result from lack of time, or from the need of complementary investments.
Introduction
The economic literature has been increasingly reporting mechanisms through which improved roads can create opportunities for economic growth and poverty reduction in rural economies (Binswanger, Khandker and Rosenzweig, 1993; among others) . Through the reduction of transportation costs, improved roads can increase productivity and demand for labor in farm and non-farm activities thus leading to increased income and consumption. Although often ignored until recently, improved roads can also have meaningful social impacts, in particular those associated to household investments in health and education (van de Walle, 2002) .
Nevertheless, macroeconomic adjustments and local governance issues have led to underinvestment in this kind of infrastructure (World Bank, 2005) . Moreover, rural transport projects have focused on building new roads or upgrading their condition, while disregarding the need to establish an institutional arrangement to guarantee timely rehabilitation and maintenance of roads (Malmberg Calvo, 1998) . In that sense, the focus of the Peruvian Rural Roads Project (RRP) on an institutional innovation that focuses on the rehabilitation and permanent maintenance of already existent rural roads, for which local private firms are promoted and contracted, makes it particularly important to be analyzed.
That is, public funds are provided not only for a one-time rehabilitation but also for permanent maintenance of treated roads, and payments to contracted local firms require a satisfactory report from PROVIAS and community supervisors. To my knowledge, there does not exist a study with a careful evaluation of the impacts of a road program that focus on a similar institutional innovation.
The analysis of this kind of interventions is particularly relevant in the current wave of decentralization in the provision of infrastructure in the developing world.
Decentralization to local governments combined with community participation can increase quality in service provision by increasing accountability of providers (World Bank, 2004 ).
However, more recent studies have been more cautious about the ultimate effects of decentralization and community participation on quality of public services and the provision of infrastructure. Local capture and corruption can make provision of infrastructure worse under decentralized mechanisms (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2006; Olken, 2007) . More empirical evidence is needed to see which of the trends end up dominating under different contexts.
Focusing on the Peruvian RRP, this paper attempts to contribute to the literature by evaluating the impacts of a unique program that focuses on an institutional innovation to improve road rehabilitation and permanent maintenance. Most of the interventions reported in the literature, especially in Africa and Asia, include building new roads or upgrading them, for instance, by paving them, while disregarding regular maintenance. Indeed, the Peruvian RRP does not include pavement upgrades as in the Blangladesh case analyzed by Khandker et. al. (2006) nor includes building new roads as in the Vietnamese case studied by Mu and van de Walle (2007) . Considering these activities are not banned in other roads, the impacts we report here are associated to an improved efficiency in road rehabilitation and maintenance with the program rather than to the absolute lack of these efforts on the part of other public agencies such as local governments, or others. To my knowledge, there is no published study that focuses on such institutional innovation.
Methodologically, we use a quasi-experimental approach that allows controlling for time-invariant unobserved characteristics of villages and households. We use a longitudinal dataset that enables us to measure impacts on a wide variety of socio-economic, institutional and environmental characteristics. Furthermore, we also explore the heterogeneity in the impacts by individual, household and village characteristics, as well as conditioning community factors for the realization of benefits. In particular, we analyze the extent to which poorer households, smaller communities, rural women, and other especially marginalized groups, benefit from the enhanced economic environment resulting from the Peruvian RRP. Policy makers would greatly benefit from identifying a conditional factor, either at the level of the community or the household, that spurs the impact of improved rural roads. However, if the key conditional factor varies too much by outcome so that no general pattern can be identified, targeting policy implications would be less clear.
Other unique features of the Peruvian RRP refer to the type of roads targeted and the timing of this evaluation. First, the Peruvian RRP does not only treat motorized roads but also non-motorized tracks. Second, although the Peruvian RRP has been operating since 1998, this study focuses on the impact of the cohort of interventions that started in 2004, and evaluates its impacts after only two years. That is, the estimated impacts we are presenting here need to be interpreted as the very early impacts of the improvement in rural roads generated by the institutional innovation.
This paper is organized in five sections including this introduction. The second section presents the key features of the intervention and discusses the expected effects.
Section 3 describes the characteristics of the data and the methodology used for estimating the impact of the Peruvian RRP. Section 4 presents the estimated impacts on the quality of the roads, and its effects on household income and expenditures, employment, as well as investments in education and health. Section 5 summarizes the results and discusses its limitations as well as some of its potential policy implications.
The program and its expected effects
The Peruvian RRP is a large program run by the PROVIAS RURAL, a unit of the Viceminister of Transport that has been operating since 1995 with the objective to improve transport conditions in rural villages by contracting private local firms to manage and carry out, on a sustainable basis, the maintenance of rural roads in the poorest areas of Peru 2 . The first phase of the RRP was carried out during 1995-2000 in 12 departments that ranked highest in rural poverty within the country. During that first phase, the project improved rural accessibility in 314 districts contracting with 495 local firms in charge of rehabilitating and maintaining about 12,000 kilometers of rural roads and key secondary roads and about 3,000 km of non-motorized tracks (Escobal, et. al., op. cit.) 3 .
The intervention
The RRP program is based on an institutional innovation that focuses on the rehabilitation and permanent maintenance of already existent rural unpaved roads and non-motorized 2 Currently, the unit running the program is called PERU DESCENTRALIZADO, an indication of the increased role of local governments in the planning and execution of the program, as part of the decentralization process being carried out within the Peruvian State. 3 The system of district-level rural roads in Peru is estimated in 70,000 kilometers. In the 12 departments the system of rural roads is estimated in 28,000 kilometers.
tracks, for which local private firms are promoted and contracted. Rural roads in Peru are the responsibility of the central government which in turn delegates it to local governments.
Thus, when a road is blocked due to floods or other weather shocks, local governments start rehabilitation with technical and financial support from the central government. However, responsibility is less clear for regular maintenance as, for instance, it is not clear where the users can complain to for excessive bumpings and stones in the roads, which in turn increase travel time as well as maintaining costs for public and private vehicles.
The Peruvian RRP commits financing from the central government, through the program, and assigns the responsibility of performing quality rehabilitation and permanent maintenance of selected rural roads to local private firms through contracts that connect regular payments to the quality of the road as periodically assessed by officials from both the program and local governments, as well as other community organizations. This assessment is not limited to checking the materials the local firms use in the rehabilitation activities, as it can also rely on observable final outcomes such as travel time to go from startpoint to endopoint of the road segment, the number of months the road is blocked due to landslides during rainy season, or the bumpiness of the road as it increase maintenance costs for private and public motorized vehicles. Thus, in principle, incentives are set for local contractors to implement a more regular maintenance, including maintenance of road drainage systems as they that could prevent blockages, or other activities that reduce costs of rehabilitation when weather shocks hit transitability of the road.
Nevertheless, the incentive structure can be damaged if the program is captured by local elites as the supervision by local authorities can become a formality. Olken (2007) reports the case of the Indonesian rural road program affected by corruption, as measured by the discrepancies between reported budgets and the budgets estimated by special supervisors based on an analysis of materials and labor used. However, it is important to notice that the Indonesian RRP, as opposed to the Peruvian RRP, does not include regular maintenance so that incentives cannot be set based on observable qualities of the road, and only by costly monitoring of the actual materials used during the construction, upgrading or rehabilitation.
The institutional innovation in the Peruvian RRP depends critically on the quality of local institutions, including local authorities and firms (Malmberg, 1998 for its name in spanish) that is going to be in charge of the periodic rehabilitation and maintenance of the selected road (Escobal, et. al., 2005) . They are then selected based on their previous experience in road maintenance, time of residence in the locality, as well as characteristics such as education, age, etc. The selected individuals are then trained in the management of the microenterprise and maintenance of the road and the MEMV is legally formed. Next, the program's local officers elaborate the annual plan of activities using a program that allows the calculation of the number of individuals and time required to rehabilitate and maintain the selected road as well as the cost per kilometer 4 . These estimates are based on the characteristics of the selected road such as its location, length, width, traffic and weather conditions. MEMVs then sign a contract with PROVIAS RURAL through which they receive monthly payments, based on the estimated costs and a quality certification issued monthly by the PROVIAS and community supervisors 5 . As mentioned above, these output-based contracts set clear incentives for the local MEMV to invest in prevention activities and provide a sustained and timely maintenance of the contracted rural road (Benavides, 2003) .
In terms of the kind of rural roads targeted by the program, it is important to point out that, unlike previous cases recently analyzed in the literature, the Peruvian RRP does not include road paving or the building of new roads. Second, the program not only considers unpaved motorized roads but also non-motorized tracks. The gradual inclusion of non-motorized tracks aims at promoting gender equity in the distribution of the intervention's impacts as these tracks were identified as the ones women use most 6 .
Expected effects
Setting the right incentives for contracted local firms should improve quality rehabilitation and maintenance of rural roads treated by the program, by reducing the time they remain blocked when large weather shocks hit, and also by reducing the time required to travel across the different points connected by the selected roads. Thus, we can expect the program to better integrate poorly accessible zones to regional economic centers, reducing transport costs and raising the reliability of vehicular access to expand markets for agricultural and non-farm products and enhancing a more diversified set of employment opportunities for rural households. Improved transportation will also reduce time to reach basic social services such as health, education and justice.
However, it is important to clarify here that our counterfactual is not complete inaction with respect to the rehabilitation of maintenance of control rural roads. Control roads may not have guaranteed financing for rehabilitation and maintenance, nor a specific agent with the clear responsibility and incentives to perform the actual physical works. 5 In case of an unsatisfactory maintenance, supervisors give time to the MEMV to repair the deficiencies. If the situation is not solved, the local office applies discounts to the monthly payments, and the contract is dissolved if the deficiencies occur over three consecutive months. 6 The program identified this fact when collected the opinions of potential beneficiaries through gender-based focus groups organized in several rural communities (see Fort and Menendez, 2005) . Additional focus groups after the intervention have confirmed that a large proportion of women see the program's road intervention enabling them to travel farther and more safely, and has also led to increased income.
Thus, control roads may take longer to be rehabilitated after a flood, or have bumps and stones that increase travel time and maintenance costs for vehicles. Still, local governments and other offices of the Ministry of Transport and Communications (MTC) and public agencies such as FONCODES may have performed related activities in control roads, especially when weather shocks blocked them. Thus, rather than the impacts of rehabilitating and maintaining a rural road, this study evaluates the effects associated to the improved efficiency in these rehabilitation and maintenance activities as a result of the reallocation of incentives due to output-based contracts that favor prevention and sustained and timely maintenance by local contractors 7 .
Many papers have shown the different mechanisms through which improved rural roads benefit the welfare of households and individuals associated to beneficiary roads (Mu and van de Walle, 2007; Khandker, et. al., 2006; Levy, 2004; Escobal y Ponce, 2002; Jacoby, 2000; among others) . We briefly summarize the most important findings of that literature, with some extra comments regarding the sequence of effects as they may affect the time needed for some of these effects to materialize. The most direct effects of the RRP are associated to the transitability of the rural roads, which are often estimated through the travel time needed to go from the initial to end points of the segment of the reference and the time (weeks or months in a year) a road stays blocked due to a climatic shock or alike. Levy (2004) , for instance, report such effects in Morocco, emphasizing on the importance of the number of months the road remained blocked in the context of rural roads. Other subsequent effects are reduced time that individuals residing in the connected villages take on average to go to key markets, schools, health facilities, depending on the nature of the role of the segment on the local road network. At the same time, the improved transitability may eventually lead to an improved public transportation service that can be measured in terms of an increased frequency of buses or reduced prices for the transportation of individuals and cargo. The latter effects are clearly conditioned on the improved transitability of treated roads, and thus they are likely to take longer to materialize.
The improved rural roads activate a series of mechanisms that transform traditional productive patterns, agricultural and non-agricultural, in the villages associated to the rehabilitated segments. First, reduced travel times help individuals access to extra off-farm employment opportunities both, agricultural and non-agricultural, within and outside the village. Escobal and Ponce (2002) find such result for the first round of interventions by the Peruvian RPP, especially non-agricultural wage employment for more educated individuals. Jacoby (2000) also argues for such effects as he finds a negative correlation between agricultural and non-agricultural wages and the distance from the village to the key markets in Nepal.
Farm productivity and income can also receive a boost as a result of reduced postharvest crop losses, lower input prices, higher output prices or improved access to financial and non-financial agricultural services, (Biswanger, Khandker and Rosenzweig, 1993) .
Improved accessibility to markets increases small farmer's bargaining power with local traders. Access to credit and agricultural extension services may take longer and come first for less poor farmers or in villages closer to larger markets, as they tend to require extra conditions such as mechanisms for agricultural risk management and organization of small local farmers. Access to these services is seen as crucial for small farmers to switch towards high-value crops.
However, these effects have not been found in all cases and often concentrated on less poor farmers, consistent with the fact that complementary investments are required for them to materialize. Moreover, income effects may at least initially be perceived as temporary and consequently households decide to increase savings through increments in livestock rather than increased consumption (Escobal and Ponce, 2002) . More important for this study is the fact that many of these effects are conditioned on adjustments in the supply of key agricultural services such as agricultural extension, credit, which may take longer to materialize. Thus, it would not be that surprising if we do not find income effects in this study, especially if we consider that the follow up in which this study is based comes only two years since treated roads started being served by the program.
Improved rural roads cannot only spur productivity and income but also household investments in the human capital of their children. As travel times are reduced, it is less costly for parents to send their younger children to school as they would need to devote less time traveling with them to the school location. Older children would in turn be able to attend school while at the same time being able to help with housework or at the family farm. Levy (2004) , for instance, finds increased school attendance, especially among girls, which may imply that improved travel security may also be an important factor for rural girls. These demand-side effects are likely to show up early. But supply-side effects may also increase household investments in schooling as quality can improve as a result of more effective attendance by teachers or even improved recruiting as a result of reduced travel times to larger villages or the capital of the district. However, the teacher's recruiting effect may be expected to take longer to show up.
Similar mechanisms can be stated to explain improved access to health services. With improved roads, visits to health facilities may take less time for the ill individual or the family member in charge of their care. The attendance and recruiting effects can be raised for doctors and other health professionals, in the same way they were mentioned for school teachers. In addition, improved roads can also help bring social programs based on health facilities closer to the associated villages, increasing access to preventive health programs that could reduce sickness events among children and adults. Qualitative studies in Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia have reported that individuals identify improved access to health services as the key benefit obtained from improved roads (see, for instance, Porter, 2002 and Hettige, 2006) .
All these positive effects may significantly alter the socio-economic context in the villages associated to the improved roads so that migration incentives in search of better employment and education opportunities may be reduced. However, at the same time, permanent and temporary migration costs are reduced. Thus, the net effect of improved roads on permanent and temporary migration may go either way.
In sum, we have seen a wide variety of potential impacts of the Peruvian RRPs.
However, not all of them are likely to show up in this early evaluation after just two years.
It is also likely that the size and time lags of these effects may vary across households and villages depending on the initial endowments of private and public assets. Poverty in developing countries is strongly concentrated in rural areas, but still there is significant heterogeneity that can lead to differentiated impacts and have important implications for project design. If higher or faster impacts are found in households and villages initially less endowed, policy makers will face a much desired win-win situation. However, if higher impacts concentrate among the initially better endowed, targeting for higher impacts may lead to increased inequalities within rural economies. Khandker et. al. (2006) and Mu and van de Walle (2007) explore the nature of these heterogeneities finding that road improvements tend to be pro-poor in rural Bangladesh and Vietnam, respectively, a very encouraging result. However, peculiarities of the Peruvian RRP demands for us to analyze whether such trend is sustained when the intervention does not include road upgrades, but instead a permanent maintenance component for both unpaved motorized roads and nonmotorized tracks.
Design, data and methodology

Quasi-experimental design
For this intervention, treatment and control roads are not chosen randomly from a set of eligible roads. Instead, treatment roads are first selected by a departmental committee (program officials and local authorities) that chooses the provinces to be intervened. Then, the PRI and the local program officials picked the specific road to be intervened at a particular round. For this treatment group, a control group was selected prior to any intervention based on similarities in key observable variables such as the longitude and type of road (rural road or non-motorized track), characteristics of the villages involved such as population size, access to basic public services and infrastructure, altitude 8 .
Another important matched variable is the hierarchy of the villages involved, so that if a district capital was involved in the treated road, the control road also connected a district capital. In addition, control roads are also required to have no intersection with a treated road or track to minimize the probability that benefits on treated villages spill over the control villages. Actually, control roads were selected within the same province but from different districts to minimize the possibility they belonged to the same road network as the treated ones but at different stages. This effort was based on information provided by three key databases: the 1999 Pre-census database (INEI), the Population Census of 2005 (INEI) and the Geo-referenced Road Map (MINTRA-MINEDU), which is rarely available in a digital format for use in economics research. Table 3 shows the pre-treatment means for treatment and control groups for many observable variables, showing there are almost not statistically significant differences between these two groups 9 .
The selection process described for this intervention has important implications for the interpretation of the impact estimates we present here. First, it implies that our indicator would estimate a treatment on the treated effect. The relationship between our estimates and the average treatment effects would depend on the nature of the prioritization. If the PRI selected roads associated to poorest and most remote villages, and those would be the ones for which the RRP impacts are smallest, then our estimates would be underestimating the average effects. On the other hand, if roads where selected so that impacts would be largest, and these officials were right in their ex-ante assessments, then our estimates would be overestimating the average treatment effect.
Second, the selection may affect our ability to identify a proper control group. The selection may be so acute that the likelihood of identifying a road similar in all characteristics to the treated ones is rather low. We argue, though, that the size of the intervention in any province and department and the measures taken by our team helped contain such potential problem. A key issue is to avoid choosing as controls roads that are systematically located at different points of the road network. For that, besides similarities in access to key infrastructure, altitude, and population, we argue the hierarchy of the towns is crucial. That is, if a capital of a district is associated to the treated road, we look for another road that connects another capital of district to a similar ending town. In general, for each treated road, we restrict the search to different districts within the same province.
However, when one of the towns was sensibly different from the rest available in the province, we looked in the adjacent provinces 10 . Although the described selection process for the control group attempts to maximize the probability the control group be equivalent to the treatment group of roads, we cannot discard the existence of certain time-variant unobservables that can affect our estimates.
Data requirements and sources
The impact evaluation presented in this paper refers to the cohort in the road. Also, number of students in primary and secondary schools, number of health 11 The Peruvian RRP also applied a baseline survey in 2000 that would allow the analysis of the impacts of that cohort of interventions, also providing valuable information about the dynamics of the effects of the RRP. That is, we would be able to verify the time lags and sustainability of effects. However, such analysis is postponed for a second stage as a very time consuming effort will be required to generate a consistent panel of the three rounds (2000, 2004 and 2006) . 12 The 2004 to treatment and control road segments 14 . In 2006, we were able to re-interview 2,167 of them, that is, we had an attrition rate of 11.8% 15 .
Methodology
The study uses the double difference estimate to determine the impact of the rural roads program on a wide variety of indicators at the level of the household and the localities involved. A basic regression-based DD estimate can be obtained from the following regression:
(1) 13 See Table 1 and Table 2 below for a list of the main indicators available in all survey rounds. 14 In 2000, a baseline was established for a sample of 2,000 household associated to the road segments that were treated during 2000-2001. That sample was also followed in the 2004 and 2006 round of surveys. 15 When a household was not initially identified, the field procedures included asking the neighbors, relatives and community leaders. Although there were a few rejections, most of the missing households corresponded to cases in which the nuclear family had moved outside the province.
where ijt Y denotes the value of an indicator of interest for household i that resides in village j at period t (t=0 is the baseline; t=1 is the follow-up survey). TC D is a categorical variable that takes value one if the household resides in a treated village and zero if it resides in a control village. AD D is a categorical variable that takes value one if the observation is from the follow-up survey and zero if it comes from the baseline. Finally, ijt ε denotes the error term which is assumed to be independent across villages but not necessarily within them 16 .
In that setting, 3 β is the DD estimator of the impact of the program on variable Y , and is often referred as an average effect as it refers to all beneficiaries without distinction.
If we identify systematic differences between the treatment and control groups in observable variables, we would need to include some controls in expression (1) to check the robustness of our DD estimate. Furthermore, we cannot assure that there are nonobservables that can establish systematic differences between treatment and control groups, but the double-difference (DD) estimate can help control for any time-invariant systematic non-observable difference by including household fixed effects 17 . Thus, a full version of the average DD estimate can be obtained from the following expression:
where t λ and ij υ denote the year and household fixed effects, respectively. As we plan to analyze the heterogeneity of the effects depending on the characteristics of the roads and the beneficiary villages, the associated econometric analysis will use the following formulation:
where X is another dichotomic variable that takes value 1 if the household or village has the characteristic of interest or concern. In that case, 3 β comes to be the DD estimator of the program's impact for those households or villages that does not have the characteristic of interest X, and 3 3 γ β + is the one for those that do have it. The impact evaluation proposed here will pay special attention to differentiated impacts by gender, education, ethnicity and village's size.
An important issue is the implications of the attrition rate on the estimates we report here. Random attrition may restrict the statistical power of a study but is mostly harmless.
However, treatment effects can be biased if missing observations are correlated with treatment. In general, if the missing observations correspond to those that would have benefited less from the RPP, then our estimates would be overestimating the treatment effects. The opposite would occur if the missing observations correspond to those that would have benefited most. An interesting point established by Angrist, Bettinger and Kremer (2006) is that if we assume that treatment is never harmful, analyzing observed households will give us a lower bound for the effect of a program. In that regard, understanding the improvement of roads can only be positive, then the estimates we report here would need to be considered as a lower bound for the impacts of the PROVIAS intervention, although our attrition rates are relatively low. (2). Results are always shown separately for motorized roads and non-motorized tracks as they may play different roles in connecting rural households to basic services.
Results
Impacts on transitability of roads
The first important verification is that the presence of the program generated a significant reduction in the average time required to travel from the start point to the endpoint of the road of reference (Table 4 ). In the case of the motorized roads, the reduction is of 28 minutes from an initial travel time of 100 minutes. In the case of the non-motorized tracks, the reduction is of 37 minutes from an initial travel time of 173 minutes.
As it was suggested from the discussion in the previous section, it would have been very interesting to measure the effect on the number of months a year the road stays closed as a result of climatic shocks. Unfortunately, such information was only collected for treated roads in the 2004 round so we cannot estimate the DD estimator for such variable.
The only thing we can verify is that such blockages were even more problematic in 2006 than in 2004. However, Table 5 also shows that community leaders and household heads tend to report an increased level of satisfaction with rehabilitation work in treated localities.
In the case of rehabilitation of motorized roads, community leaders in treated villages reported an adequate work in 81% of the cases by the follow up survey, up from 62% at baseline. A similar increased satisfaction is observed among households as they increased the reports of positive benefits out of the rehabilitated road. This increased satisfaction among household heads is also found in the case of non-motorized tracks. Nevertheless, an initially puzzling result was to find that community leaders reported deterioration in the quality of the rehabilitation and maintenance work in non-motorized tracks with the program. However, discussions with PROVIAS officers suggest that such reports may be more connected to dissatisfaction with the unfulfilled expectation for the track to be upgraded to a motorized road, rather than an evaluation of the quality of the rehabilitation performed by the contracted MEMV 19 .
These results are non-trivial for the program. First, the positive results on travel time and in the perception of the quality of the program intervention provide evidence against corruption of the program's mechanism in the sense that, for instance, payments to
MEMVs would continue even with reductions in the quality of the rehabilitation and maintenance. Second, positive impacts are still present despite the fact that the program has been operating since 1998 and many local governments have seen their revenues increase during this decade as a result of economic growth and progress in the decentralization process. Indeed, the mechanism could have been reproduced by other public agencies, as it is suggested by the number of other roads associated to treatment and control villages that were treated during the period of observation (Table 4 ). In the case of motorized roads, for instance, villages associated to treated (control) roads had 0.92 (0.73) roads rehabilitated during the previous two years at baseline, and that number increased to 1.72 ( In the following sub-sections, we analyze the implications of the improved transitability upon income and expenditure patterns, employment decisions and household human capital investments by type of road. Table 6 reports the effects of the RRP on household labor income (farm and non-farm), expenditures and poverty. We do not find significant effects in any of these variables.
Impacts on labor income, employment, expenditures and poverty
These results are not that surprising considering previous studies that have argued that investments in rural roads are not enough to improve the way rural household connect to key markets, For this study, we also need to keep in mind that two years may not be enough time for changes to materialize 21 . Although markets could become closer as a result of improved roads, key agents may need time to adjust to new conditions. For instance, for farm income, farmers may take more time to recognize that it has become less convenient for them to sell their crops by the field or adjacent road than in local fairs or regional markets. Even if they already noticed it, it may not be that easy for farmers to break the long-term relationship with local merchants 22 .
Before going further trying to explain the absence of these income effects, we may want to further explore the existence of evidence that economic conditions may have changed with the RRP as a result of improved transitability, by looking at sub-groups of the beneficiary population, or by looking at other related variables such as individual employment decisions. Table 7 starts by exploring whether there are sub-groups that could 21 Recall that the interventions in the round of treated roads we are analyzing started in 2004 and the follow up survey was done in 2006 (see discussion in section 2). 22 See Escobal (2005) for a discussion of the complexity of the decision process associated to selection of markets by Peruvian rural farmers in Huancavelica. The author argues that local merchants establish more personal relationships with local farmers as they tend to be their first alternative to sell. Such sales provide the farmer with the cash necessary to afford taking chances at more profitable but also further and riskier markets such as local fairs or regional markets. Huancavelica is part of the area targeted by the Peruvian RRP. present some positive and significant effects, despite that none are found on average.
Interventions that enhance productivity of farmers tend to benefit most, or first, those that were better off before the program, as they tend to have all the other conditions required to benefit from improved roads. However, it is also feasible to find a pro-poor bias if the less poor are less constrained by bad roads because they may have other assets to compensate. In particular, we explore these hypotheses by checking for heterogeneous impacts by schooling, ethnicity of the household head, village size and altitude. The analysis by village size may be particularly important in the case of the Peruvian RRP. Fieldwork for the 2006 survey showed that in many cases treated roads were connecting a relatively large village with a very small one, with many other small villages along the road. If one thinks that some of the relatively large villages already have key markets and public services available, then we could expect that larger impacts would concentrate on the smaller villages as they would be the ones for whom transaction costs would reduce most. Table 7 shows that the RRP did have effects on household labor income for households residing in villages above 3,400 meters above sea level for which a motorized road was treated. Households with more educated heads and residing in larger villages (more than 850 inhabitants) also present positive impacts but they fall short of being statistically significant. On the other hand, treated non-motorized tracks show even weaker average effects and more variability, with no specific group presenting any positive significant income effects.
These results suggest that the RRP might have generated some positive changes in economic conditions, at least for motorized roads, but they need more time or complementary investments to lead towards strong effects on household labor income.
Such hypothesis is further supported when we observe effects on employments decisions by individuals. Indeed, Table 7 shows that individuals residing in villages associated to treated motorized roads increase in 10 days a year their dedication to waged employment, both agricultural and non-agricultural, and reduce their participation in the family farm as unpaid family worker. These effects are small with respect to total days worked a year by an individual (171), which could explain why it does not lead towards significant increases in household income, but they are indeed important with respect to the time dedicated to waged employment at baseline. Moreover, non-motorized tracks increase in 16 days a year their dedication to the farm as a non-remunerated family worker. Those 16 days a year represent a 30% increase from the number of working days they dedicated to this kind of labor at baseline.
In Table 8 , we analyze the changes in employment patterns generated by the RRP intervention by age, gender and mother tongue. The switch observed in motorized roads towards wage employment seems to be led by adults in the peak of their productive years;
that is, between 25 and 50 years old. At the same time, though, females seem to increase their participation in agricultural jobs while males focus on non-agricultural jobs. Notice that in the case of females, they seem to be abandoning work at the farm where they were participating as a non-remunerated family worker. In the case of non-motorized tracks, the opposite switch towards farm work is also concentrated among females. Another important result is that employment effects seem to accrue among individuals reporting quechua or aymara as their mother tongue.
The important gender effects on employment are very relevant, especially in the case of non-motorized tracks, as they were specifically included in the program for their relevance to women. We would need to explore further these changes to determine which of these opposite switches in employment patterns imply some empowering of women.
Thus, employment effects support the hypothesis that economic opportunities may have indeed changed with the RRP, but they are not large enough to imply income effects, except when focusing on households residing in villages above 3,400 meters above sea level for which a motorized road was treated. Next, we analyze effects on household investments in the education and health of their members.
Impacts on household investments in human capital
With respect to household investments in human capital, we find a strong school attendance effect for children in villages associated to treated motorized tracks, and in morbidity and use of local health facilities for both types of roads. School attendance effects are clearly differentiated by gender and age (Table 9) 24 . Attendance increased about 7 percentage points among older boys (12-18 years old), an important effect considering that attendance by such group at baseline was only 84 percent. Considering the age group, it is possible that this effect may imply that boys are better able to attend secondary school while continuing living within the nuclear family, rather than permanently migrating to a larger city 25 . For the younger girls (6-11 years old), school attendance increased 6 percentage points from an initial 93% attendance rate for this group at baseline. That is, these young girls are reaching perfect attendance to primary school, eliminating a previously negative gender bias.
Lack of effects on younger boys may not be of concern, considering that the level of attendance of this group was already very high (95%) at baseline. On the other hand, the lack of effects among older girls is worrisome as this group had the lower level of attendance at baseline, and indicates that gender inequalities are still affecting girls in the higher levels of primary school or at the entrance to high school. If that is the case, it would be useful to identify whether the reason is associated to a lower value parents give to higher 24 The attendance reported here refers to the period prior to the survey, and not the current one.
Luckily, ENAHO has both variables. Current attendance is much lower at around 50% for high school level students, but the reports on attendance in the previous period in ENAHO are similar to those reported here. 25 This hypothesis will be further evaluated with the individual migration data that has not been included in this version of the study. education of girls, or if it is explained instead by the higher vulnerability girls face with respect to the level of insecurity when traveling longer distances.
Finally, Table 10 reports the impact of the Peruvian RRP on morbidity and use of health services by adults and children under five. We find a reduction in the incidence of illnesses and accidents in the four weeks prior to the date of the survey, especially for children under five and in the villages with treated motorized roads. In this case, the morbidity rate falls almost 4 percentage points among all members, but the reduction is almost 9 percentage points when looking only at children under five. The effect on the use of health services (consultations) is also negative which is somewhat puzzling. An explanation could be that improved rural roads may be helping the health system reach better the population from remote areas not by attending them when sick but rather by providing them with useful health information that helps them prevent the illness events and the need for consultations at the health center. Such hypothesis is indeed consistent with the finding that households with children under five in these localities report having benefited more (6-8 percentage points) from early childhood development programs, and considering that most of the work of the corresponding nutritional and health programs is made off the health post or center (see Table 11 ).
On the other hand, a somewhat puzzling result is found among those that were treated through non-motorized tracks, as the use of consultations at health facilities for children under five drops by 12 percentage points, even though the reduction in morbidity is not found statistically significant. However, we should be careful with these results as the sample size for children under five in these localities is rather small, something that is also true for the educational outcomes reported in Table 9 (see Table 12 )
Summary and discussion
We studied here the early impacts of a rural roads program that is based on an institutional innovation characterized by the contracting of private local firms for the rehabilitation and maintenance of rural roads with local supervision by community leaders setting incentives that favour prevention activities and a sustainable and timely maintenance of rural roads.
We find that this institutional innovation, promoted by the PROVIAS
DESCENTRALIZADO of the Ministry of Transport and Communication, quickly
improved road transitability which in turn led to significant changes in employment patterns and increased investments in education and health, but not on household labor income. These results vary significantly by the type of road under consideration, though, consistent with the idea that motorized roads and non-motorized tracks play different roles in the road network connecting individuals to key places such as farm fields, markets, schools, etc.
Lack of income effects may be due to the need of complementary investments or because it is still too early for these effects to materialize. Unfortunately, we are not able to disentangle these forces, although it is true that the follow up survey we analyze here was done only two years after the beginning of the intervention. When looking at income effects by sub-group, though, we do find positive and significant effects for households residing in high altitude villages where a motorized road was treated. Households with more educated heads and in larger villages that were treated with motorized roads also show positive effects, but they fell short of becoming statistically significant. Also, employment changes show that more waged employment opportunities, both agricultural and non-agricultural, become available for those treated with motorized roads. On the other hand, for treated non-motorized tracks, individuals tend to increase their participation in the family farm.
Thus, economic opportunities seem to be changing as a result of the program although they
have not yet led to increased labor income.
Also, the differences in employment opportunities by type of road indicate they play different roles in connecting rural people to key markets. Motorized roads seem to be playing the more recognized role of connecting rural households to larger cities where product and job markets are more developed. Non-motorized tracks, on the other hand, play a more important role in mobilizing individuals from their houses to the farm fields, especially for adult women.
Changes in employment patterns also vary substantially by gender. In treated motorized roads, females tend to reduce their participation as unpaid family worker at the family farm to work more outside, though still in agricultural activities. Males on the other hand seem to have better access to waged non-agricultural jobs as a result of the RRP. In turn, in treated non-motorized tracks, changes are only found on females, who also work more, but at the family farm. Thus, they can work more at the family farm without having to reduce time dedicated to domestic work.
The Peruvian RRP also had early effects on school attendance and morbidity in the case of treated motorized roads underscoring the importance of this type of interventions for household investments in human capital. The school attendance effects, however, are not found significant for older girls (12-18 years old) , for which the attendance problem was more worrisome to begin with, and suggest the need for further interventions to promote gender equity in schooling investments by rural households. The morbidity effects in turn are especially significant for children under five. These results would indicate the need to consider availability of rural roads when analyzing the capacity of the Juntos program to enforce the conditionalities on school attendance and health checkups by mothers and children.
In sum, the results of this early evaluation are positive and hopeful about the impacts of the Peruvian RRP, and more generally, for the contracting of local private firms for the rehabilitation and maintenance of rural roads in developing countries. Although we do not find robust income effects, we have strong evidence that transitability of rural roads improves substantially with the program, and that led to meaningful changes in economic opportunities and increases in household investments in education and health of their children. Also, the analysis by road type confirms that the inclusion of non-motorized tracks allows women to increase their participation in labor activities at the family farm.
Considering that this study focuses on the cohort of interventions that started in 2004, six years after the beginning of the program, the positive effects also indicate that the intervention has been able to control corruption threats. It may still be the case that some money be deviated and or that some special families benefit more from employment by local firms, but the output-based contracts have allowed for improvements in road transitability to still be observed.
Finally, considering that the analysis presented here is based on a follow up survey applied after only 1-2 years from the beginning of the intervention, it would be important to extend the analysis to earlier interventions by the RRP so that we could elucidate whether, for instance, the lack of income effects is because they need more time to show up, or whether complementary interventions are required. More generally, following older interventions over time would allow us to explore deeply into the dynamics of the effects of the RRP, that is, which impacts need more time to mature, and also, whether earlier impacts are sustained in time. (3), (6) and (7) are adjusted by clustering at household level. Coefficient and standard deviations in column 8 control for household-level fixed effects. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Follow-up DD DD (FE) Notes: Each group of rows of the same category is from a separate regression. Coefficient and standard deviations control for householdlevel fixed effects. Double difference estimates are reported as measures of impact. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Heterogeneous categories are defined as follows. Schooling: Lower if for household head with primary or no education; Higher, with secondary or higher education. Village size: Small is for villages with less than 300 inhabitants; Medium, with more than 300 to 850 inhabitants; Large, with more than 850 inhabitants. Altitude: Low is for villages which are 2500 meters above sea level, Medium, between 2500 and 3400 meters above sea level, High, from more than 3400 to 5500 meters above sea level. Small is for villages with less than 300 inhabitants; Medium, with more than 300 to 850 inhabitants; Large, with more than 850 inhabitants. Altitude: Low is for villages which are 2500 meters above sea level, Medium, between 2500 and 3400 meters above sea level, High, from more than 3400 to 5500 meters above sea level. Mother tongue: if the mother tongue of the household head is quechua/aymara or spanish.
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